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We estimate the amount of income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) be-
tween OECD countries during the period 1970{2003 with a particular focus on EU and
EMU countries. Income smoothing from international factor income has increased in
the EU and, in particular, the EMU but not in the non-EU OECD since the intro-
duction of the Euro. Consumption smoothing from pro-cyclical government saving has
declined in the EMU, but not in the non-EU OECD, since the signing of the Maastricht
treaty. We ¯nd that when capital gains and losses on international asset positions are
considered part of income, the magnitude of capital gains leads to huge amounts of
income smoothing and dis-smoothing although, at the time horizons we examine, the
capital gains or losses are only weakly re°ected in consumption. Understanding the
role of capital gains in risk sharing appears to be of ¯rst order importance.
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International Integration, Risk Sharing, External Capital Gains.
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11 Introduction
Income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between countries can increase welfare.
For countries in a monetary union, risk sharing may be particularly important because
monetary policy is unable to address \asymmetric" shocks, where some countries experience
negative shocks while others are booming. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) suggest that the
risk sharing provided to states by the U.S. federal government may be essential in making
the United States a successful \monetary union."1
We refer to the situation where consumption grows at identical rates in all countries
as full risk sharing and we label the growth rate of a country-level variable minus the
union-wide counterpart as the \idiosyncratic" growth-rate. We consider risk sharing to
be higher, the less idiosyncratic consumption growth co-varies with idiosyncratic income
growth. There are di®erent ways that countries can obtain risk sharing which we refer to
as channels of risk sharing. The main channels are cross-ownership of assets that \smooth"
income (making income growth in a country less sensitive to output growth in that country),
transfers that smooth disposable income for given income, and borrowing and lending that
smooth consumption for given disposable income. Asdrubali, S¿rensen, and Yosha (1996)
(ASY) derive a simple way of quantifying the relative contributions of various channels of
income and consumption smoothing within a common framework. ASY ¯nd, for the United
States, that market institutions provide the bulk of risk sharing through income smoothing.
S¿rensen and Yosha (1998) (SY) use similar methods to evaluate channels of risk sharing
between countries in the European Union (EU) and in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). They ¯nd that risk sharing was mainly provided
by pro-cyclical government saving with some risk sharing resulting from by pro-cyclical
corporate saving at shorter horizons.
A key development in the last decade has been the steep increase in international asset
trade|or \¯nancial globalization" in the words of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Devel-
oped countries have expanded their gross and, to a smaller extent, net holdings of foreign
assets dramatically. If, say, German investors hold large quantities of dollar denominated
1For early contributions, see von Hagen (1992), Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993), Goodhart and
Smith (1993), and Bayoumi and Masson (1995).
2foreign assets while foreign countries hold liabilities of Germany denominated in Euros,
then °uctuations in asset prices and/or °uctuations in exchange rates can have very large
e®ects on the net worth of a country. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and others point out
that such valuation e®ects can play a signi¯cant role in the process of adjustment of interna-
tional imbalances|in particular, the large net debt position of the United States has been
reduced signi¯cantly through valuation e®ects since the beginning of the new millennium.
In this paper, we examine if capital gains have played a major role in international income
and consumption smoothing.2
Our work focusses on countries in the OECD with a particular focus on members of the
EU and the European Monetary Union (EMU) and one objective of the paper is to gauge
if the formation of the EMU has had an impact on risk sharing in the EU. It is feasible,
indeed likely, that risk sharing is endogenous to the formation of a currency union.3 A
common currency is likely to reduce the costs of trading or information gathering and
therefore lead to higher cross-ownership of ¯nancial assets. The removal of currency risk
may further stimulate foreign direct investment and the integration of bond markets|
already documented for the EMU see, for example, Adam et al. (2002) and Baele et al.
(2004)|will imply deeper and more liquid markets for borrowing and lending.4 It is less
obvious how important these e®ects are quantitatively for risk sharing. Several years have
passed since the adoption of the Euro and while integration of ¯nancial markets likely takes
time to evolve, making it to early to draw de¯nitive conclusions, we can get a preliminary
reading.5
We ¯nd that smoothing through factor income °ows|resulting from international cross-
ownership of assets|after being negligible in the past has increased steeply in the EMU
although it is still at a low level. On the other hand, smoothing of consumption through
2Note that the term \capital gains" is used whether the \gains" are positive or negative.
3Following Frankel and Rose (1998), De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) consider more carefully how the
criteria for optimally of currency areas may be endogenous and provide evidence from the EMU.
4S¿rensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) show that larger holdings of foreign assets are associated with more
international risk sharing. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and S¿rensen (2007) demonstrate that the integration
of banking markets in the United States was following by increasing income smoothing.
5Shocks to the EMU economies have become more shallow in the last decade as documented by, for
example, Ginannone and Reichlin (2005)|potentially reducing the importance of risk sharing. This reduced
volatility seems to be a world-wide phenomenon and the reasons for it are not well understood, leaving open
the possibility that this is a temporary pattern.
3government counter-cyclical saving has declined sharply for the group of EMU countries
leading to less overall risk sharing. Whether this pattern is due to the constraints on ¯scal
de¯cits imposed by the Growth and Stability pact and whether it is a permanent pattern
remains to be seen as the monetary union matures.
Risk sharing through net capital gains from external positions is potentially very im-
portant.6 Capital gains on international positions have been numerically large since the
early 1990s and, when included in income, has signi¯cantly bu®ered or ampli¯ed output
shocks in di®erent countries|in other word capital gains have very large e®ects on income
risk sharing but the e®ect is often not in the direction that smooth income. Most capital
gains and losses have been absorbed in savings and have not had a large impact on overall
consumption risk sharing at the horizons that we explore|risk sharing from capital gains
is, however, estimated very imprecisely. A more precise evaluation is likely not possible
without longer samples which are not available until the era of ¯nancial globalization has
been with us for another decade or two.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic theory
of perfect risk sharing and our way of measuring the degree of risk sharing from various
channels. Section 3 discusses our econometric approach while Section 3 presents the em-
pirical results. Section 4 examines the role of capital gains and Section 5 concludes. An
appendix shows how capital gains are estimated and regresses capital gains on potential
determinants as a background for interpreting their role in risk sharing.
2 Full Risk Sharing and Perfect Consumption Smoothing:
Theory
The basic theory of international risk sharing is well known|see Obstfeld and Rogo®
(1996)|and we only outline the basic ideas for endowment economies with one homo-
geneous tradable good. Period t per capita output of country i is an exogenous random
variable with a commonly known probability distribution. The representative consumer of
6We calculate international capital gains following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005).
4each country is a risk averse expected utility maximizer.7 Consumers within each country
are identical with Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility functions and perfect Arrow-
Debreu markets for contingent claims exist. Optimal consumption then satis¯es the full
risk sharing relation where ki is a country speci¯c constant, ci
t is country i per capita con-
sumption, and C
W
t is world per capita consumption in period t. When risk is fully shared
among countries, the consumption of a country co-moves with world consumption but not
with country speci¯c shocks.
If the period t utility function of country i is µi
t u(¢) where µi
t is an idiosyncratic taste
shock (normalized so that §i(1=µi
t) = 1 in all periods), then consumption, assuming perfect






in any state of nature. Consumption in country i is no longer a ¯xed fraction of world
consumption, but the central property of equation (1) is preserved: Consumption of coun-
try i is a®ected by aggregate shocks and by idiosyncratic taste shocks, but not by other
idiosyncratic shocks (including income shocks).
A testable implication is that consumption growth rates are identical for all countries;
i.e., ¢logci
t = c + ¢log C
W
t + ²it; where c is a constant and ²it is an error term|
due to either taste shocks or noise. An implication is that after controlling for aggregate
consumption growth, the consumption growth rate of a country should not be a function of
output growth of that country. Regression based tests for full risk sharing at the country
level were conducted by Obstfeld (1994), Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996)|see
Lewis (1995) for a comprehensive survey.8
It is of more interest to quantify the extent of risk sharing between countries rather than
7We do not consider non-separabilities in the utility function between consumption and leisure or non-
tradable output. See Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996) for a treatment of these issues in the
context of international risk sharing.
8The ¯rst tests for full risk sharing, using individual-level data were performed by Cochrane (1991),
Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994).The International Real Business Cycle literature, most notably Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Stockman and Tesar (1995) have examined
the prediction that the correlation of consumption across countries should be equal to unity. The data are,
however, far from con¯rming that prediction.
5test the abstract ideal of perfect risk sharing. It is also interesting to identify the exact
channels through which risk is shared and to quantify the amount of risk sharing obtained
via each channel. ASY developed a method for answering these questions. The method
takes equation (1) as a benchmark, and quanti¯es the deviation from this benchmark,
interpreting the deviation as the amount of risk that is not shared.
2.1 Channels of income insurance and consumption smoothing
There are several mechanisms for sharing risk. The most straightforward way of sharing
risk internationally is through international income diversi¯cation; i.e., through cross-border
ownership of productive assets. Net income from foreign assets is re°ected in the National
Accounts data as the di®erence between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross Na-
tional Income (GNI). We initially ignore potential capital gains. 9 If risk is fully shared
through this channel, country level GNI-growth will be proportional to world GNI-growth:
¢log GNIi
t = c + ¢log GNI
W
t + ²it:
If risk is not fully shared through factor income °ows, there are further possible chan-
nels for smoothing consumption. Depreciation doesn't vary one-to-one with GDP|this
source of risk sharing is not very interesting but it needs to included if we want to consider
all \wedges" between GDP and consumption. GNI minus depreciation is (net) National
Income (NI). NI can be smoothed through international transfers. We refer to NI plus
net (incoming) international transfers as Disposable National Income (DNI). If DNI is not
perfectly diversi¯ed consumption can be smoothed through pro-cyclical saving behavior.
Individuals save and dis-save in order to smooth consumption intertemporally. If DNI
is highly persistent, individuals may|if there behavior is guided by permanent income
considerations|-optimally choose to engage in very little consumption smoothing through
saving although patterns of life-cycle saving may or may not help smooth consumption. If
°uctuations in DNI are transitory, individuals will optimally choose to engage in consump-
tion smoothing through saving.10
9GNI was previously called Gross National Product (GNP).
10Baxter and Crucini's (1995) showed that even if only a riskless asset can be traded, equation (1) will
approximately hold if shocks to GDP are transitory. That is, when shocks to GDP are transitory, borrowing
and lending in the credit market is a close substitute for income insurance. In contrast, if shocks to GDP
6The variance decomposition described below allows us to measure the fraction of shocks
to GDP that are smoothed through international factor income °ows, through saving,
and the fraction of shocks that are not smoothed, namely, the residual deviation of the
international consumption allocation from equation (1), the full risk sharing benchmark.
2.2 Decomposing the cross-sectional variance of shocks to GDP









Ci + Gi(Ci + Gi); (2)
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is an index of countries. To stress
the cross-sectional nature of our derivation, we suppress the time index.
Taking logs and di®erences on both sides of (2), multiply both sides by ¢log GDPi (minus
its mean) and taking the cross-sectional average, we obtain the variance decomposition
varf¢log GDPig = covf¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi;¢log GDPig
+ covf¢log GNIi ¡ ¢log NIi;¢log GDPig
+ covf¢log NIi ¡ ¢log DNIi;¢log GDPig
+ covf¢log DNIi ¡ ¢log(Ci + Gi);¢log GDPig
+ covf¢log(Ci + Gi);¢log GDPig :
In this equation \varfXg" and \covfX; Yg" denote the statistics 1
N
PN




i=1(Xi ¡ ¹ X)(Yi ¡ ¹ Y), respectively, where N is the number of countries in the sample.
Dividing by varf¢log GDPig we get 1 = ¯f + ¯d + ¯¿ + ¯s + ¯u; where, for example,
¯f =
covf¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi;¢log GDPig
varf¢log GDPig
(3)
is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of
are highly persistent, consumption smoothing through trade in a riskless bond will not approximate the
allocation in equation (1), namely, the credit market will not closely mimic the role of capital markets|
shocks that were not insured ex-ante on capital markets will not be smoothed ex-post on credit markets.
7¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi, and similarly for ¯d, ¯¿, and ¯s. The last coe±-
cient in the decomposition is given by:
¯u =
covf¢log(Ci + Gi);¢log GDPig
varf¢log GDPig
; (4)
which is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression
¢log(Ci + Gi) on ¢log GDPi.
If there is full risk sharing, covf¢log(Ci + Gi);¢log GDPig = 0, and hence ¯u = 0.
If full risk sharing is not achieved, then consumption in country i varies positively with
idiosyncratic shocks to country i's output, and ¯u > 0. A cross-sectional regression of
consumption on output, controlling for °uctuations in world consumption is, therefore, a
test of full risk sharing.11
If full risk sharing is achieved through income insurance via factor income °ows,
covf¢log GNIi;¢log GDPig = 0 and hence, covf¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi;¢log GDPig =
varf¢log GDPig, implying ¯f = 1. Moreover, in this case, since consumers in each country
can consume their national income, namely, Ci + Gi = GNIi, consumption will not co-vary
with income, implying ¯u = 0.12
Suppose that full risk sharing is not achieved through income insurance via factor income
°ows and capital depreciation, but is achieved through the combination of factor income
°ows, depreciation, and international transfers. Then DNI will be perfectly correlated with
\world" DNI and, by analogous reasoning, ¯f + ¯d + ¯¿ = 1, and since consumers in each
country will consume their DNI, ¯u = 0. Similarly, if the full risk sharing allocation is
achieved through factor income °ows, depreciation, international transfers, and saving,
consumption C+G will satisfy equation (1). Then, by analogous reasoning, ¯f+¯d+¯¿+¯s =
1 and ¯u = 0.
¯u is the fraction of shocks to GDP that is not smoothed. The coe±cients ¯f, ¯d, ¯¿, and
11This is the test suggested by Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994) who test for full risk sharing by running
cross-sectional (or panel) regressions of consumption on income, controlling for aggregate movements in
income and consumption. Cochrane's (1991) test is very similar.
12If full risk sharing is not achieved through income insurance via factor income °ows, then
covf¢log GNI
i;¢log GDP
ig > 0 and hence, covf¢log GDP
i ¡ ¢log GNI
i;¢log GDP
ig < varf¢log GDP
ig, im-
plying ¯f < 1.
8¯s are interpreted as the fraction of shocks absorbed through factor income °ows, deprecia-
tion, international transfers, and saving, respectively. If consumption satis¯es equation (1),
they sum to unity and ¯u = 0. If not, they sum to less than unity. In either case, they re-
°ect the incremental amount of smoothing achieved through the various channels discussed
above.
We not impose any restrictions on the sign of the ¯-coe±cients. If a country that is hit
by a positive shock has a smaller share of GDP allocated to, e.g., capital consumption, then
depreciation provides cross-sectional dis-smoothing. Similarly, if taxes increase or decrease
less than proportionately with output, they provide dis-smoothing.
2.3 The role of Government, Personal, and Corporate Saving in Con-
sumption Smoothing
Pro-cyclical saving is often the major channel of risk sharing and in order to obtain a
deeper understanding we examine which components of saving are more counter-cyclical.
Net national saving consists of three components: Personal, corporate, and government
saving. This role of each of these components can help shed light on institutional barriers to
consumption smoothing|for example, whether the 1992 Maastricht requirements regarding
government debt, and the subsequent Stability and Growth Pact, have been impediments
to risk sharing from pro-cyclical government saving.13
The corporate sector will contribute to income insurance if it adjusts patterns of earnings
retention so that a larger share of pro¯ts is distributed to shareholders during recessions.14
Individuals may desire to smooth consumption through personal saving by borrowing
and lending. The ability of individuals to smooth their consumption through cross-country
borrowing and lending depends on whether the banking system, and credit markets in gen-
eral, are su±ciently integrated internationally|otherwise, say, an increase in the demand
for loans may increase the domestic interest rate leading to less borrowing. Ostergaard,
13Gali and Perotti (2003) ¯nd that the Maastricht rules in practice have not limited the ability of ¯scal
policy in the EMU to be counter-cyclical. However, their metric is somewhat di®erent from our risk sharing
measure.
14This is consistent with the standard textbook view that corporations smooth dividend payout ratios,
adjusting them only in response to shifts in long-run sustainable earnings; see, e.g., Brealey and Myers
(1991, Chapter 16).
9S¿rensen, and Yosha (2001) and S¿rensen and Yosha (2000) ¯nd that aggregate state-level
consumption and, therefore, savings patterns are closer to the prediction of the Permanent
Income Model than aggregate country-level consumption. Whether this implies more or
less risk sharing at the country-level in our metric depends on the time-series properties of
shocks to disposable income.
2.4 Allocation of Saving
The amount of consumption smoothing achieved through saving can also be decomposed
according to the \destination" of savings, namely, domestic physical investment versus
investment abroad. Net investment abroad equals the current account surplus CA and S =
I + CA, where \I" denotes net domestic physical investment. If higher saving in a country
in a particular year is mainly re°ected in higher investment in that country in the same
year, this would indicate that international investment patterns do not respond strongly
to shocks and, therefore, do not contribute to cross-country consumption smoothing. The
well-known paper by Feldstein and Horioka (1982) raises the question of why saving and
investment at the country-level are so highly correlated. While there may be conditions
where this is an optimal outcome, a high correlation between investment and saving is
typically considered a symptom of lack of international ¯nancial integration.
In theoretical work risk sharing is typically modeled as the shipping of goods abroad in
good times.15 We denote net export by Xi ¡ Mi and examine if GDPi ¡ Xi + Mi is smoothed
relative to output (after controlling for aggregate e®ects).
3 Estimation
3.1 Estimating channels of risk sharing
At the practical level, the following (panel) equations are estimated:
¢log GDPi
t ¡ ¢log GNIi




t ¡ ¢log NIi
t = ºd;t + ¯d ¢log GDPi
t + ²i
d;t ;
15See Heathcote and Perri (2004) for an example.
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t) = ºu;t + ¯u ¢log GDPi
t + ²i
u;t ;
where º¢;t are time ¯xed e®ects. The time ¯xed e®ects capture year speci¯c impacts on
growth rates, most notably the impact of the growth in aggregate EU (or OECD) output.
Furthermore, with time ¯xed e®ects the ¯-coe±cients are weighted averages of the year-by-
year cross-sectional regressions. To take into account autocorrelation in the residuals we
assume that the error terms in each equation and in each country follow an AR(1) process.
Since the samples are short, we assume that the autocorrelation parameter is identical
across countries and equations. We further allow for state speci¯c variances of the error
terms. In practice, we estimate the system in (5) by a two step Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) procedure. Unless we say otherwise, we use di®erenced data at the yearly frequency,
although we will also show results for longer di®erencing intervals. Because our method is
based on panel estimations with time ¯xed e®ects, it yields fully consistent estimates even
if there are worldwide taste shocks.
3.2 Finding determinants of risk sharing
Consider, for example, the estimated income smoothing from factor income °ows, ¯f. M¶ elitz
and Zumer (1999) impose structure on ¯f so that ¯f = ¯f0 + ¯f1 °i, where °i is an \in-
teraction" variable that a®ects the amount of smoothing that country i obtains. S¿rensen,
Wu, Yosha, and Zhu extended this method by allowing ¯f to change over time, as follows:
¯f = ¯f0 + ¯f1 (t ¡ ¹ t) + ¯f2 (Xit ¡ X); (6)
where Xit is a variable that potentially may impact on risk sharing. We subtract the mean
of the \interaction variables" in order to leave the interpretation of ¯f0 as the average
amount of income smoothing.
In practice, we estimate the time varying amount of income smoothing by running the
11regression
¢log GDPi
t ¡ ¢log GNIi
t = ºf;t + ¯f0 ¢log GDPi
t + ¯f1 ¢log GDPi
t ¤ (t ¡ ¹ t)
+ ¯f2 ¢log GDPi
t ¤ (Xit ¡ X) + ²i
f;t ;
possibly including further interaction variables. We, similarly, examine if the amount of
consumption smoothing from saving, ¯s, varies with interaction variables.
4 Results
4.1 Data
The data are from the OECD National Accounts, Main Aggregates (Volume I) and Detailed
Tables (Volume II), various issues, covering the period 1970{2003. The OECD countries
in our sample consist of all 2005 members except Luxembourg (very small and atypical),
Iceland (incomplete data), and Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia,
and Turkey (less developed countries). We use three subsets of the OECD members in
the various regressions. The EMU countries with the exception of Luxembourg.16 \EU"
denotes all the 2003 EU member countries, excluding Luxembourg.17 OECD{EU denotes
the OECD members in our sample excluding the 14 member countries of the EU.18
4.2 Income insurance and consumption smoothing among EMU and OECD
countries
Table 1 displays the estimated percentages of GDP-shocks smoothed through each channel,
among EU, EMU, Non-EU developed OECD (\OECD") countries, for the period 1971{
2003. Conceptually, the coe±cients add up to 100 percent but we choose not to impose
this constraint.
16Our EMU sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
17The EU sample consists of the EMU sample plus Denmark, Sweden, and U.K.
18OECD{EU consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
States.
12From the ¯rst line in Table 1, it is immediately apparent that the contribution of cross-
country factor income °ows to cross-country risk sharing, among EU as well as OECD
countries, was not been signi¯cantly di®erent from zero on average.19 Of course, it is well
known that cross-country assets holdings were small during that period as documented by
French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995), so this result is no big surprise.
Foreign factor income °ows consists almost solely dividend, interest, and other earnings
accruing to capital. Income of, say, a U.S. resident working in the UK is also part of factor
income, but earnings of, say, a Turkish citizen who is a resident of Germany is part of
German GNI and doesn't enter factor income °ows.
Depreciation contributed negatively to income smoothing. This variable isn't very inter-
esting because depreciation is a function of past investment and, besides, is mainly imputed.
However, the negative sign is intuitive because when output goes up depreciation typically
doesn't move with output and therefore a larger share of output is available for income and
consumption. We will not further comment on this channel.
During 1971{2003, transfers did not contribute to risk sharing. Transfers include o±cial
transfers, such as contributions to the EU budget and foreign aid, and workers remittances
which, on average during this period, were fairly small.
The fourth line in Table 1 indicates that the bulk of consumption smoothing of EU
and OECD countries is achieved via saving. Such smoothing need not involve actual cross-
border °ows of funds but can be re°ected in domestic ¯xed or inventory investment. The
point estimate for consumption smoothing through national saving is higher for the OECD
countries but the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant. Overall, two-thirds of output
shocks were not smoothed during this period. SY found virtually identical results for the
period 1966{1980 and for the OECD (including EU) in the 1980s. We will examine how
our results vary by subperiods and in particular if risk sharing has increased in the EMU
in recent periods.
SY stated: \..the large amount of consumption smoothing achieved in the European
Community via government borrowing may not be sustainable in an EMU where ¯scal
coordination must be maintained. Until private capital and credit markets develop, there
19SY found a similar results for the period previous to 1990.
13may be a need for a greater insurance role of European Community institutions." So, did
the role of government change? Table 2 repeats the exercise of Table 1 for the period
1999|2003 after the introduction of the Euro. Two things have indeed changed: First,
factor income now smooth 11 percent of GDP shocks in the EMU and still nothing in the
OECD and, second, consumption smoothing through national saving has decreased steeply
in the EMU and increased in the OECD: 72 percent of shocks to GDP in the OECD are
smoothed while only 34 percent are smoothed in the EMU. transfers contribute modestly,
but signi¯cantly, to income smoothing in the EMU. We do not have enough observations to
make clear statements of the di®erence between the EMU and the three EU members that
are not member of the EMU;20 however, including the non-EMU EU countries weakens
the e®ect of factor income smoothing lending at least weak support to the notion that the
common currency is helping this channel of risk sharing.
Did factor income smoothing increase slowly over the full sample or steeply after the
introduction of the Euro? Table 3 addresses this question. The answer is: Factor income
smoothing rose steeply after the introduction of the Euro. The table also shows that factor
income smoothing robustly has been zero before 1999|the one signi¯cant number for the
1970s for the EMU is the lone signi¯cant number before that period. This recent increase is
consistent with the large decline in home bias in asset holdings documented by, for example,
S¿rensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007). Foreign asset holdings need to be very large in order
to provide signi¯cant smoothing. To ¯x thoughts, think of the case where all capital in a
country is owned by foreigners and residents of the country own foreign assets in the same
amount.21 Assume, as is also often done, that one third of GDP accrues to capital. Then
one would expect 33 percent of output shocks to be smoothed by factor income. As an
illustration, consider how our measure works in a 1-period case where GDP in a country
starts at GDP0 and GDP1 = 1:1 ¤ GDP0. If world per capita GDP in both periods is ¯xed
at GDP0 then GNI1 = :33 ¤ GDP0 + 0:66 ¤ GDP1 = GDP0 + 0:66 ¤ (GDP1 ¡ GDP0). We have
¢log GNI1 ¼ 0:66¤¢log GDP1 which show that 33 percent of the output shock is smoothed
20Particularly since Denmark ties its currency very tightly to the Euro so that it isn't really obvious how
it would be better classi¯ed.
21The capital-output ratio is often assumed to be around three so, roughly, this would be a case where
the level of gross foreign asset holdings is three times GDP.
14by factor income °owing to other countries in a situation where all capital is owned by
foreigners and foreign output is uncorrelated with domestic output.
Mechanically, there are two reasons why foreign net factor income might smooth GNI:
First, when output goes up factor income paid to other countries typically increases|
proportionally to output in our simple example and, second, factor income received does
not move one-to-one with output. In reality, many other patterns can occur and it is
possible for factor income to even dis-smooth. An example would be a country that pays
interest on debt and pays a very large risk premium on bonds issued. In the face of high
domestic growth the risk premium on debt may decline and interest payment to foreigners
may decline. The high growth is overall a good situation for the country, but in this
example it results in negative insurance. Of course, the reverse situation when output
falls and interest paid goes up is particularly onerous. A more likely situation for OECD
countries may be one where a country has a large net debt position and the world interest
rate falls, to take a concrete example, leading to lower debt payments. If creditor countries
happen to grow fast during such a period while debtor countries grow slowly, debt holdings
could contribute negatively to measured risk sharing.
We examined if risk sharing from factor income paid is higher than from factor income
received. We did not obtain signi¯cant coe±cients and the coe±cient were unstable when
estimated for di®erent sub-periods and we do not tabulate the results. More years with
substantial international factor income °ows are needed to be able to answer this question
empirically.
Table 4 displays a breakdown by subperiods for risk sharing from transfers. Transfers
contribute positively to income smoothing in the EU area since 1980 although the e®ect has
been relatively small since 1999. Smoothing from transfers captures the combined impact
of EU o±cial transfers and remittances. The magnitude is not large, about 5 percent in the
1980s and 1990s and a bit smaller since 1999 but the impact is statistically signi¯cant and
appears robust. For no subperiod do transfers smooth income signi¯cantly in the OECD
outside of the EU.
We observed that saving contribute much less to consumption smoothing in the EU than
in the remaining OECD since 1999. Is that a recent phenomenon? Table 5 addresses that
15issue. For all subperiods are the amount of consumption smoothing through saving smaller
in the EU. The numbers are very similar for EU and EMU countries so the indication is
that this may have more to do with EU institutions than with the common currency. The
divergence between the EU and the OECD since 1999 is striking. We examined if the
high numbers for the OECD were due to an outlier like Norway, where the government
saves large amounts of oil-revenues, but this is not the case. We will next explore which
components of saving is the cause of this behavior.
Table 6 examines sub-channels of consumption smoothing through government, cor-
porate, and private saving. Pro-cyclical government saving have provided increasing con-
sumption smoothing outside of the EU area and since 1996 an amazing 86 percent of GDP
°uctuations have been smoothed by the government. The pattern is very di®erent in the
EU, starting from insigni¯cant smoothing from government saving in the late 1980s, 36
and 46 percent of shocks were smoothed in the EU and EMU areas, respectively, in the
early 1990s but since 1996 government saving became signi¯cantly less pro-cyclical in these
countries. Corporate saving contributes signi¯cantly to consumption smoothing in the EU
although the exact amount varies somewhat over time while corporate saving has not con-
tributed signi¯cantly to consumption smoothing in the remaining OECD. Private saving
has been dis-smoothing (counter-cyclical in the EMU and EU until 1996 after which the
e®ect is positive but statistically insigni¯cant). It is not necessarily rational for consumers
to smooth income shocks: Permanent income theory of consumption would predict that
consumption reacts to future expectations and if a positive income shock leads to expecta-
tions of future positive income shocks it may be rational to raise consumption by more than
income. In the OECD, private saving has also not contributed to consumption smooth-
ing since 1996 although in the earlier periods private saving did contribute positively to
consumption smoothing.
In Figures 1{4 we illustrate the results discussed so far in graphical form for non-EU
and EMU countries (EU countries are similar). Figure 1 shows the total amount smoothed
and the contribution from saving. While there is some noise the pattern of increasing
contributions from saving in the OECD is fairly clear and the decreasing contribution from
saving in the EMU is particularly clear. In the OECD the combined contribution from
16other channels of smoothing is negative in all years while in the EMU this is, fortunately,
not the case: As the contribution from saving has declined to near zero by the new century
other channels of smoothing has kept the overall amount of risk sharing at about 40 percent.
Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the contribution from saving. The divergent trends in
consumption smoothing from government saving in the EMU versus the non-EU OECD are
particularly visible. Private, including corporate, saving displays an increasing contribution
to consumption smoothing in the EU but little long-trend in the OECD.
Figure 3 displays the contributions from transfers and factor income. In the EMU,
factor income has contributed little to income smoothing until about 1994 where a strong
increasing trend become visible. S¿rensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) show that this
pattern is highly correlated with increasing holding of foreign assets. Smoothing from
transfers were initially negative but turned positive around 1980 with a slow decline since
the mid 1980s. In the OECD, transfers do not contribute either way and the impact from
factor income °ows is also very small with a negative contribution around 1991. Negative
income smoothing is the case where GNI, say, declines more than GDP which occurred in
some countries in the early 1990s (for example, in Sweden a severe banking crises resulted
in a drop in GDP and an even larger drop in GNI).
The patterns in consumption smoothing from government saving are very strong and
in order to interpret the results we, in Figure 4, display the ratio of the saving components
to GDP. (This is not a measure of risk sharing because there is no controls for OECD-wide
e®ects; nonetheless, the ratio is informative about determinants of risk sharing.) The ratio
of government saving to GDP dips in the OECD during the recessions in the early 1980s,
the early 1990s, and early in the present century which is what our regressions correctly
pick up as consumption smoothing. In the EMU, this pattern is much weaker|it seems
that for some reason EMU governments switched from surpluses to large de¯cits until the
mid-1990s after which they steeply increased saving, presumably to meet the Maastricht
criteria. Overall, we are left wondering if this is a particularly optimal pattern of saving
although we of course do not evaluate the myriad of non-risk sharing considerations that
may have motivated this. Counter-cyclical behavior of corporate saving is visible since 1990
in the EMU.
17The term \risk sharing" indicates that countries or agents share risk with others.
Nonetheless, risk sharing as we, and others, usually measure it, may be obtained even
in autarky if countries allocate a larger share of GDP to physical investment in good times.
Recall that national saving is the sum of net investment and the current account surplus,
where the latter equals ¯nancial investments abroad. We measure the contribution from
each of these channels in an alternative decomposition of consumption smoothing from sav-
ing. It may also be of interest to examine how net exports correlated with output °uctua-
tions because theoretical economic models often consider risk sharing as the net shipment of
goods abroad in good times. We measure the fraction of shocks smoothed via domestic net
investment by estimating the coe±cient in the regression of ¢log GDPi¡¢log(GDPi¡Ii) on
¢log GDPi. Similarly, we measure the fraction of shocks smoothed via the current account
surplus (\investment abroad") as the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi¡¢log(GDPi¡CAi)
on ¢log GDPi. Due to non-linearity (and to the way we correct for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation) the smoothing from the current account and from investment will not add
up to the smoothing from saving but conceptually it does.
The results, displayed in Table 8, for four sub-periods, indicate that until 1999 all
smoothing is achieved via domestic investment. The ¯nding that shocks to output are
smoothed via domestic net physical investment is consistent with the pro-cyclical behavior
of investment in aggregate U.S. data; see Blanchard and Fischer (1989). In the 1970s
investment achieved the bulk of income smoothing in all regions while the impact declined
in the 1980s and 1990s and for the 1999{2003 period the impact is only 11 percent in the
EMU and insigni¯cant in the EU. In the OECD, the decline is smaller and net investment
still smooth 25 percent of shocks. The joint observations of large smoothing from saving and
large smoothing from investment is consistent with the observation (\puzzle") of Feldstein
and Horioka (1990) that saving and investment is highly correlated at the country level|
a ¯nding that usually is interpreted as a re°ection of low ¯nancial integration between
countries.
Surprisingly, the current account contributed negatively, or not at all, before 1999.
In the period after 1999 there is no e®ect in the EMU (re°ecting that overall saving is
not contributing to consumption smoothing) but for the OECD this channel contributes
1835 percent to consumption smoothing. This result indicates that the Feldstein-Horioka
\puzzle" is becoming less serious as countries become more prone to invest their savings
world-wide.22
We use a similar regression to see if net exports smooth income: The coe±cient in the
regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log(GDPi ¡ (Xi ¡ Mi)) on ¢log GDPi measures the fraction of
shocks. The results show that until very recently, net exports played no role in consump-
tion smoothing. However, for the OECD countries there has been a large contribution to
consumption smoothing through net exports since 1999.
Short term °uctuations in consumption have small welfare implications compared to
longer lasting °uctuations and hedging against longer run °uctuation are therefore impor-
tant. Table 9 examines if the results are di®erent when the time-period considered is three
years, rather than one. SY found that consumption smoothing was signi¯cantly lower at
the three-year frequency, in particular due to smoothing through corporate saving being
of short duration.23 Comparing the results with those of Table 1, we see slightly less risk
sharing at the longer horizon but not signi¯cantly less so.24
ASY and SY found evidence that smoothing from cross-ownership of assets is much
more \permanent" than smoothing from saving. In Table 10 we examine smoothing from
factor income in the upper panel and from saving in the lower panel by sub-periods. In the
EMU, we ¯nd a very large smoothing e®ect from factor income for 2000{2002. Due to the
short sample (a single 3-year period) this is only suggestive but the result is accordance
with our prior expectations. On the other hand, it is puzzling why factor income °ows
provided negative risk sharing at this frequency for the OECD countries.25
Table 11 and Table 12 study if income smoothing from factor income and consumption
smoothing, respectively, vary systematically with time, being a member of monetary union,
22Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argue that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle is a thing of the past in the
Euro area.
23Becker and Ho®mann (2006) perform a more systematic examination of risk sharing at di®erent
frequencies.
24This sample includes only one observation per country so the results are imprecisely estimated as
indicated by the large standard error. Clearly more observations are needed to corroborate that this result
re°ects more than transitory conditions.
25These results are mainly suggestive and we choose to end the sample in 2002 because this break-up into
sub-periods gives the strongest contrast between the 1990s and the 2000s.
19etc. S¿rensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) showed that risk sharing increase with holdings
of foreign assets and we do not revisit that issue. Instead we follow M¶ elitz and Zumer
(1999) and examine if richer (high GDP), and EMU countries obtain more risk sharing
and there is a trend in risk sharing.26 We show results for an early (1971{1987) and a late
(1988{2003) sample.
For international factor income, we ¯nd that richer countries obtained signi¯cantly less
income smoothing in the early part of the sample. This result also hold for the later sample
but no longer with statistical signi¯cance. The trend is insigni¯cant but negative in the
early sample and positive and signi¯cant in the later sample|this isn't surprising given our
earlier results. The EMU dummy is positively signi¯cant in the late sample but otherwise
insigni¯cant. For saving we ¯nd, in Table 12, that richer countries obtained signi¯cantly
more consumption smoothing. EMU countries obtained dramatically less consumption
smoothing while the trend is signi¯cant and positive to the late sample. Longer samples
and, likely, more variables are needed in order to determine a longer list of determinants of
risk sharing but our results serve to demonstrate that the di®erent patterns of risk sharing
found for the EMU countries are not simply capturing variables such as output level or
interest rates that were left out in the earlier tables.
5 Capital Gains on International Assets and Risk Sharing
Recorded international factor income °ows re°ect interest, dividends, and realized capital
gains but typically not unrealized capital gains. Therefore, our results this far may vastly
understate the role of international assets in the provision of risk sharing. For common
stocks, capital gains often swamp dividend °ows|and for international assets, currency
°uctuations are likely to further create large capital gains. Such gains have increased
signi¯cantly in magnitude in later years as gross ¯nancial holdings of foreign assets, in
particular equity, have gained importance. For example, during the last three years of our
26We also examined if risk sharing depends on the world (U.S.) interest rate, with country-speci¯c interest
rates, with world output, with the world aggregate business cycle (the output of our total sample ¯ltered
through a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter). Neither of these interaction terms delivered signi¯cant results and we
do not display the estimated coe±cients.
20sample, 2001{2003, capital gains of U.S. investors from external portfolio holdings were
around 8 percent of GDP on average. It is therefore important to consider the role of
capital gains in risk sharing|a role that seems not to have been previously explored.
Capital gains smooth income if capital gains typically are negative when a country
has high GDP growth. In this situation, one might expect negative capital gains because
domestic stocks typically gain in relative value during economic booms. Also, high growth
may be associated with currency appreciation which decreases the value of foreign assets
which are typically denominated in foreign currency. In order to measure income smoothing




t) = ºk;t + ¯k ¢log GDPi
t + ²i;t ; (7)
where \(capital gains)i
t" is the year t net international capital gains and losses. ºk;t is a
time ¯xed e®ect. The regression examines if output plus capital capital gains (which can
be considered as \income" available before other channels of risk sharing) varies less that
one-to-one with output. If that is the case, there is positive risk sharing from capital gains.
The estimated coe±cient ¯k is our measure of such risk sharing.
If capital gains are considered part of \income," the estimates of consumption smoothing
will look quite di®erent from those presented so far. We estimate consumption smoothing
in this case by examining how \saving" (income plus net capital gains minus consumption)






t) = ºks;t + ¯ks ¢log GDPi
t + ²i
s;t : (8)
In this regression, ºks;t is a time ¯xed e®ect and ¯ks is the measure of consumption smooth-
ing.
Table 13 displays income smoothing from capital gains for the periods 1992{1999 and
1999{2003. It is immediately apparent from Table 13 that capital gains can have very large
e®ects. It is also apparent that these e®ects are extremely unstable and may change signs
from from one period to another|this lack of stability is also re°ected in large standard
21errors. This should not be surprising: Imagine a country with foreign assets of an order
equal to GDP. If assets are denominated in foreign currency units and the currency ap-
preciates by 10 percent the country su®ers a negative capital gain equal to 10 percent of
GDP which typically is of a larger magnitude than growth. If the country happened to be
growing faster than average such a negative capital gain constitutes a very large amount of
risk sharing while for a country that su®ers a negative capital gain at a time of slow growth,
the capital gain creates large negative risk sharing. Either way, volatility of exchange rates
spills over into volatility of risk sharing. In the Appendix we show results from a regression
of capital gains on interest rates, exchange rates, etc. These results verify that exchange
rate movements have been a major source of capital gains, in particular for countries with
large debt positions. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) study the role of exchange rates in
creating capital gains in much more detail.
The columns labeled ¯k report income risk sharing from capital gains. The results can
vary a lot with the sample, indeed for these results the EU and EMU results a dramatically
di®erent, likely re°ecting di®erent stock market and exchange rate experiences for the UK
and the EMU countries. For the EMU, income risk sharing has been large and negative
during 1999{2003 where the EMU countries were relative laggards in terms of growth while
the Euro was appreciating. Did this pattern lead to volatile consumption? It appears not,
because when we include capital gains and losses in income this tends to lead to large and
opposite e®ects on the estimated risk sharing from saving. For example, for EMU countries
we found very little risk sharing from saving in the late period in Table 2 and here we ¯nd
more than 100 percent risk sharing from saving! This result re°ects that individuals do
not adjust consumption much in the face of international capital gains and losses. Large
amounts of foreign assets are held by ¯nancial institutions or indirectly through pension
or mutual funds and apparently the marginal propensity to consume from capital gains
on such funds is typically small at shorter time horizons. However, over long periods of
time, capital gains are bound to matter: For example, pension funds will eventually pay
out pensions as a function of the value of the assets held.
In Table 14, we examine the role of capital gains in the same manner as in Table 13 but
over 3-year intervals. The results for income smoothing look even more unstable than the 1-
22year results. This partly re°ects that the early sample contains just two 3-year periods and
the latter sample only one; however, we still clearly observe that large increases or declines
in income smoothing from capital gains typically are almost fully matched by opposite
movements in consumption smoothing from saving when capital gains are counted as part
of income.
Overall, risk sharing from capital gains appears very unstable and we are not really able
to say if such capital gains may help smooth consumption in the long run. But possibly
such capital gains may dominate other sources of income and consumption smoothing.
Much longer time series are needed in order to answer this question but as foreign asset
holdings become increasingly large, international capital gains are likely to impact more on
consumption. The role of international capital gains in risk sharing is worthy of much more
attention that it has achieved this far.
6 Concluding Remarks
We found clear patterns in risk sharing when capital gains are ignored: Steep increases
in consumption smoothing outside of the EU due to increasingly pro-cyclical government
saving. In the EU risk sharing has been declining due to less pro-cyclical government saving
although this is partly compensated by increasing income smoothing from net foreign factor
income.
Capital gains and losses, when added to income, can totally swamp other channels of
risk sharing but it appears that, say, positive capital gains are saved rather than consumed
resulting in little change in overall consumption risk sharing at least for the horizons we
can study at the present.
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26Table 1
Income and Consumption Smoothing (percent) by National Accounts Categories
EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{2003 1971{2003 1971{2003
Factor Income (¯f) 0 2 ¡1
(1) (1) (1)
Depreciation (¯d) ¡5 ¡5 ¡7
(1) (1) (2)
Transfers (¯¿) 1 1 0
(1) (1) (0)
Saving (¯s) 36 41 53
(3) (4) (4)
Not Smoothed (¯u) 68 61 56
(3) (3) (4)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. ¯f is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi, ¯d
is the slope in the regression of ¢log GNIi¡¢log NIi on ¢log GDPi, and similarly for ¯¿ and
¯s. ¯u is the coe±cient in the regression of ¢log(Ci + Gi) on ¢log GDPi. We interpret the
¯-coe±cients as the incremental percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each level,
and ¯u is the percentage of shocks not smoothed.
27Table 2
Income and Consumption Smoothing (percent) by National Accounts Categories
EU EMU OECD{EU
1999{2003 1999{2003 1999{2003
Factor Income (¯f) 6 11 ¡1
(3) (4) (3)
Depreciation (¯d) 7 8 ¡7
(3) (3) (3)
Transfers (¯¿) 3 3 ¡1
(1) (2) (1)
Saving (¯s) 12 12 81
(8) (7) (9)
Not Smoothed (¯u) 73 66 28
(6) (6) (4)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors are in brackets. ¯f
is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi,
¯d is the slope in the regression of ¢log GNIi ¡¢log NIi on ¢log GDPi, and similarly for ¯¿
and ¯s. ¯u is the coe±cient in the regression of ¢log(Ci + Gi) on ¢log GDPi. We interpret
the ¯-coe±cients as the incremental percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each
level, and ¯u is the percentage of shocks not smoothed.
28Table 3
Factor Income Smoothing (percent) among OECD Countries
EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{1980 1 3 ¡2
(1) (1) (1)
1981{1990 ¡2 1 ¡2
(2) (2) (2)
1991{1999 0 3 ¡1
(2) (3) (3)
1999{2003 6 11 ¡1
(3) (4) (2)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. ¯f is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi.
29Table 4
International Transfers Smoothing among OECD Countries
EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{1980 ¡2 ¡3 ¡1
(1) (1) (1)
1981{1990 4 5 0
(1) (2) (0)
1991{1999 4 6 0
(2) (2) (1)
1999{2003 2 3 ¡1
(1) (1) (1)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. ¯f is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log NIi ¡ ¢log DNIi on ¢log GDPi.
30Table 5
Total Savings Smoothing among OECD Countries
EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{1980 53 53 62
(5) (6) (7)
1981{1990 24 26 43
(4) (6) (6)
1991{1999 34 41 47
(6) (7) (9)
1999{2003 12 12 81
(7) (8) (9)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.
Standard errors in brackets. The table shows ¯s, the GLS estimate of the slope in the
regression of ¢log DNIi ¡ ¢log CONi on ¢log GDPi.
31Table 6
Smoothing via Government, Private and Corporate Saving among OECD Countries
Government Corporate Private
Saving Saving Saving
EU EMU OECD-EU EU EMU OECD-EU EU EMU OECD-EU
1987{1990 9 0 25 10 8 6 ¡17 ¡15 12
(7) (11) (5) (7) (5) (10) (4) (5) (11)
1991{1995 36 46 50 7 4 ¡11 ¡18 ¡17 21
(8) (9) (8) (9) (8) (6) (11) (6) (8)
1996{2001 10 19 83 12 9 ¡4 1 6 -5
(5) (6) (7) (3) (1) (2) (6) (6) (7)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland ,France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece,Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Norway, U.S. and after 1990 Japan. Standard errors in brackets. The
table shows the GLS estimates of the slope in the regressions of ¢log DNIi¡¢log(DNIi¡ net
government saving) on ¢log GDPi, ¢log DNIi¡¢log(DNIi¡ corporate saving) on ¢log GDPi
and ¢log DNIi ¡ ¢log(DNIi¡ private saving) on ¢log GDPi.
32Table 7
Smoothing through Domestic Net Physical Investment, Current Account and via Net
Exports among OECD Countries for years 1971-2003
EU EMU OECD{EU
Net Investment 43 37 33
(4) (4) (6)
Current account ¡10 ¡7 3
(3) (3) (4)
Net Exports ¡3 ¡4 3
(3) (2) (3)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. We
measure the fraction of shocks smoothed via domestic net physical investment by estimating
the coe±cient in the regression of ¢log GDPi¡¢log(GDPi¡Ii) on ¢log GDPi. Similarly, the
coe±cient in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log(GDPi ¡ CAi) on ¢log GDPi measures the
fraction of shocks smoothed via investment abroad and the coe±cient in the regression of
¢log GDPi¡¢log(GDPi¡(Xi¡Mi)) on ¢log GDPi measures the fraction of shocks smoothed
via net exports.
33Table 8
Smoothing through Domestic Net Physical Investment, Current Account and via Net
Exports among OECD Members for Di®erent Subperiods.
Net Current Net
Investment Account Export
EU EMU OECD{EU EU EMU OECD{EU EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{1980 65 61 60 ¡7 ¡14 3 ¡8 ¡3 4
(7) (9) (12) (3) (6) (4) (4) (5) (9)
1981{1990 34 39 30 ¡15 ¡13 ¡6 ¡7 ¡8 1
(6) (7) (10) (5) (7) (6) (5) (6) (5)
1991{1999 31 35 18 0 1 4 2 2 ¡3
(4) (4) (7) (4) (5) (5) (3) (4) (5)
1999{2003 6 11 25 ¡6 ¡5 35 1 5 23
(4) (5) (10) (2) (5) (11) (2) (5) (11)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks are absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets.
We measure the fraction of shocks smoothed via domestic net physical investment by es-
timating the coe±cients in the regressions of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log(GDPi ¡ Ii) on ¢log GDPi
Similarly, coe±cient in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡¢log(GDPi ¡ CAi) on ¢log GDPi mea-
sures the fraction of shocks smoothed via the current account surplus and coe±cient in the
regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log(GDPi ¡ (Xi ¡ Mi)) on ¢log GDPi measures the fraction of
shocks smoothed via net exports.
34Table 9
Income and Consumption Smoothing (percent) by National Accounts Categories.
Three-Year Frequency of Observation.
EU EMU OECD{EU
1971{2003 1971{2003 1971{2003
Factor Income (¯f) ¡2 1 ¡3
(2) (2) (2)
Depreciation (¯d) ¡4 ¡4 ¡6
(2) (2) (2)
Transfers (¯¿) 1 0 0
(1) (2) (1)
Saving (¯s) 31 34 48
(4) (5) (7)
Not Smoothed (¯u) 74 69 61
(4) (5) (6)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Per-
centages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets. ¯f is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi, ¯d
is the slope in the regression of ¢log GNIi¡¢log NIi on ¢log GDPi, and similarly for ¯¿ and
¯s. ¯u is the coe±cient in the regression of ¢log(Ci + Gi) on ¢log GDPi. We interpret the
¯-coe±cients as the incremental percentage amounts of smoothing achieved at each level,
and ¯u is the percentage of shocks not smoothed. \¢Xt" here refers to Xt ¡ Xt¡3 for any
variable X. Non-overlapping observations.
35Table 10 Factor Income and Total Saving Smoothing among OECD Countries.
Three-Year Frequency of Observation.
Panel A: Factor Income
EU EMU OECD{EU
1982{1990 ¡5 ¡7 ¡2
(3) (4) (4)
1992{2000 9 ¡2 ¡6
(3) (3) (1)
2001{2003 14 15 3
(7) (7) (9)
Panel B: Total Saving
1982{1990 30 42 27
(8) (9) (11)
1992{2000 26 22 39
(7) (6) (6)
2001{2003 ¡6 ¡8 87
(2) (2) (30)
Notes. EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU:
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.
Percentages of shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors in brackets.
Factor income smoothing is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡
¢log GNIi on ¢log GDPi, similarly the total saving smoothing is calculated by regressing
¢log DNIi ¡ ¢log CONi on ¢log GDPi. \¢Xt" here refers to Xt ¡ Xt¡3 for any variable X.
Non-overlapping observations.
36Table 11
Smoothing via Factor Income (percent) by National Accounts Categories with the
Interaction Variables for OECD Countries.
1970{2003 1970{1987 1988{2003
¢log GDP ¡1 ¡1 ¡1
(1) (1) (1)
¢log GDP*GDPave ¡9 ¡9 ¡8
(4) (5) (5)
¢log GDP*TREND ¡1 ¡5 6
(1) (2) (2)
¢log GDP*EMU 4 ¡4 9
(3) (4) (4)
Notes: OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, U.K., and the United States. Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
¢log GDPi ¡¢log GNIi. GDPave refers to real GDP per capita averages of OECD countries.
EMU is a dummy variable taking 1 for the countries that are members of European monetary
union, 0 elsewhere.
37Table 12
Smoothing via Saving (percent) by National Accounts Categories with the Interaction
Variables for OECD Countries.
1970{2003 1970{1987 1988{2003
¢log GDP 64 57 68
(2) (3) (3)
¢log GDP*GDPave 73 35 127
(18) (22) (23)
¢log GDP*TREND 6 ¡1 18
(3) (7) (6)
¢log GDP*EMU ¡32 ¡35 ¡33
(12) (15) (15)
Notes: OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, U.K., and the United States. Standard errors in brackets. The dependent variable is
¢log GDPi ¡¢log GNIi. GDPave refers to real GDP per capita averages of OECD countries.
EMU is a dummy variable taking 1 for the countries that are members of European monetary
union.
38Table 13
Smoothing via Factor Income and Saving Including Net Capital Gain from External
Assets
1992{1999 1999{2003
¯k ¯ks ¯k ¯ks
EU 41.54 ¡15.94 6.68 21.11
(27.88) (37.21) (52.10) (59.33)
EMU 10.67 9.49 ¡129.11 197.62
(56.90) (72.45) (77.95) (84.51)
OECD-EU 7.67 39.24 28.83 ¡13.50
(13.60) (18.95) (13.37) (23.14)
Notes: EMU: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Belgium,
Finland, Ireland, and Greece are excluded due to missing data. EU: Austria, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU: Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. Percentages of shocks
absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors are in brackets. ¯k is the GLS
estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GDPKi on ¢log GDPi, where
GDPK = GDP+ net capital gains. ¯ks is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
¢log DNIKi ¡ ¢log CONi on ¢log GDPi where DNIK = DNI+ net capital gains.
39Table 14
Smoothing via Factor Income and Saving Including Net Capital Gain from External
Assets. Three year Frequency of Observation.
1995{2000 2001{2003
¯k ¯ks ¯k ¯ks
EU ¡27.49 41.78 ¡176.60 238.69
(19.23) (26.98) (187.6) (189.21)
EMU ¡25.01 71.70 ¡183.50 247.59
(23.67) (41.03) (226.20) (225.33)
OECD{EU 18.68 30.23 146.80 ¡94.58
(37.84) (38.74) (57.17) (58.35)
Notes: EMU: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Belgium,
Finland, Ireland, and Greece are excluded due to missing data. EU: Austria, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and U.K. OECD{EU: Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. Percentages of shocks
absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors are in brackets. ¯k is the GLS
estimate of the slope in the regression of ¢log GDPi ¡ ¢log GDPKi on ¢log GDPi, where
GDPK = GDP+ net capital gains. ¯ks is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
¢log DNIKi ¡ ¢log CONi on ¢log GDPi where DNIK = DNI+ net capital gains.\¢Xt" here
refers to Xt ¡ Xt¡3 for any variable X. Non-overlapping observations.
40APPENDIX
Calculation of Capital Gains from External Assets
Net capital gains from external assets are not directly available. Therefore, we employ the
method of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) who provide a detailed accounting framework
that separates the basic factors|trade imbalances, investment income °ows, and capital
gains. Net capital gains from foreign assets are derived as
KGt = ¢FAt ¡ CAt ¡ ERRt; (9)
where KGt is the capital gains on net foreign assets in aggregate levels, FAt is the net foreign
asset position of the domestic country i at time t, and ¢FAt is the change in the net foreign
asset position. The current account, CA, equals to the sum of the balance on goods, services,
and current transfers while the term ERRt includes factors such as capital account transfers
and errors and omissions that leads to discrepancies between a country's current account
and net in°ows of capital.27
We calculated the net foreign asset position using the IMF's balance of payment com-
ponents. The net foreign asset position, FAt, is roughly de¯ned as the sum of the net debt,
net equity, net foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and foreign exchange reserves.
We use the following identity to calculate the foreign asset position of country i at time t:
FAt = DEBT(A)t + EQUITY(A)t + FDI(A)t + FXt ¡ DEBT(L)t ¡ EQUITY(L)t ¡ FDI(L)t ; (10)
where DEBT(A), EQUITY(A) and FDI(A) are the stocks of debt, equity, and FDI assets. Sim-
ilarly DEBT(L), EQUITY(L) and FDI(L) are the stocks of debt, equity and FDI liabilities re-
spectively, and FX refers to the foreign exchange reserves of the country. All the variables
used in creating the net foreign asset position are extracted from the IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS).
27Detailed codes and descriptions of each variable extracted from the International Financial Statistics
Database(IFS) are listed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
41Estimating Determinants of Net Capital Gains
In order to help interpret the results involving capital gains we conduct a minor study
of the determinants of capital gains. Changes in exchange rates are likely to result in
capital gains for countries with large holding of assets and liabilities because assets and
liabilities often are denominated in di®erent currencies. Similarly, world-wide swings in
stock market valuations are likely to result in capital gains and losses. We regress country-
level capital gains (in dollar terms normalized by the U.S. consumer price index) on the
value of external equity assets and liabilities, on external debt assets and liabilities, on the
change in the exchange rate (the amount of appreciation), on the interaction of external
debt assets and liabilities with appreciation, on the interaction of debt assets with the U.S.
interest rate (10-year bond yield), on the interaction of debt liabilities with the domestic
interest rate, on the interaction of equity assets and liabilities with appreciation, and on
the interaction of equity assets and liabilities with the value of the U.S. stock index and
national stock index, respectively.
To conduct the panel data regression, we utilize annual returns on equity and debt
markets for OECD members. The data for standard national stock indices are taken from
Morgan Stanley Capital International Database (MSCI) for 1970 through 2004. MSCI
provides national stock indices that have become the most widely used international equity
benchmarks by institutional investors. For the debt returns, for the same sample, we
used the 10-year risk-free bond returns extracted from the International Monetary Fund's
International Financial Statistics database.
Tables A1 and A2 display the results of the following panel regression:
CAPITALGAINi
t = ±0 + ±1 DEBT(A)i
t + ±2 DEBT(L)i
t + ±3 EQUITY(A)i
t (11)
+ ±4 EQUITY(L)i
t + ±5 ¢EXCHi
t + §k±5+k Xi
kt; (12)
where the Xk terms refer to interaction variables. The interaction variables enter in the









: for any variable X is the average over time for country i.
The results for the EMU countries are presented in Table A1 for 1992{1998 and for
421999{2003. It is immediately clear that the estimated e®ects are much larger in the later
sample, consistent with the EMU economies becoming more open and increasing their
international ¯nancial exposure. We comment on the 1999{2003 period: the coe±cients to
debt and equity assets are positive and signi¯cant implying that countries with large asset
holdings have obtained capital gains. Countries that appreciated also obtained capital
gains on average although this e®ect isn't economically large as the dependent variable is
measured in millions of dollars. The interacted terms have clear interpretations. Countries
with large holdings of foreign assets su®ered negative capital gains when the U.S. interest
rate increased. This is intuitive but the coe±cient is not signi¯cant. Countries obtained
capital gains if they had large debt liabilities and the domestic interest rate increased.
Countries with large equity asset holdings enjoyed capital gains when the national equity
index increased while they su®ered losses if they had large equity liabilities and the domestic
stock market boomed. As for the interactions involving the exchange rates, we ¯nd a very
large signi¯cant coe±cient for debt liabilities interacted with the exchange rate. If domestic
bonds outstanding in international markets are denominated in domestic currency then
negative capital gains are to be expected when the domestic currency appreciates|similar
e®ects will be found a countries with debt issued in Euros if bonds are held in, say, the
United States. A smaller but also signi¯cant coe±cient is found for equity liabilities. The
e®ects for asset holdings are of the opposite sign, as expected, but not as signi¯cant.
The results for the OECD are similar with much higher statistical signi¯cance of the
estimates in the later sample. However, the estimated coe±cients tend to be somewhat
smaller for this group of countries.
43Table A1




























Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. EMU: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Other EMU members are omitted from regressions
due to missing data. Columns contain the GLS estimates from the regression of net annual
capital gain on various explanatory factors. The dependent variable is the net annual capital
gain of country i from its external positions in U.S. dollars. (Here \i" refers to relevant
country observation in the panel.) DEBT(A) and EQUITY(A) are the external debt and equity
asset positions of country i in (de°ated) U.S. dollars. Similarly, DEBT(L) and EQUITY(L) are
the debt and equity liability positions. ¢EXCH is the annual change in the value of the
country i's currency per U.S. dollar. ¢Rus and ¢Ri are the annual(percentage) changes
in the 10-year government bond yield for the U.S. and country i, respectively. Similarly,
¢EQUITYINDEXus and ¢EQUITYINDEXi are annual percentage changes in the Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) equity index for the U.S. and country i markets respectively.
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Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. OECD: Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.
Rest of the OECD members are omitted from regressions due to missing data. Columns
contain the GLS estimates from the regression of net annual capital gain on various ex-
planatory factors. The dependent variable is the net annual capital gain of country i from
its external positions in U.S. dollars. (Here \i" refers to relevant country observation in the
panel.) DEBT(A) and EQUITY(A) are the external debt and equity asset positions of country i
in (de°ated) U.S. dollars. Similarly, DEBT(L) and EQUITY(L) are the debt and equity liability
positions. ¢EXCH is the annual change in the value of the country i's currency per U.S. dol-
lar. ¢Rus and ¢Ri are the annual percentage changes in the 10-year government bond yield
for the U.S. and country i, respectively. Similarly, ¢EQUITYINDEXus and ¢EQUITYINDEXi
are annual percentage changes in the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) equity
index for the U.S. and country i markets respectively. 45    
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